The Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC) was the brain-child of the Goss Government, which promised to overhaul the Queensland public service after 32 years of conservative Coalition rule. Like the fifteenth-century religious Reformation in Europe, Goss’s bureaucratic Reformation provided Queensland’s public service the opportunity to break away from the staid yoke of political conservatism. There is little doubt that there was support from members of the public service for a reform of the public sector after the Bjelke-Petersen Government’s abolition of the Public Service Board in the mid-1980s, which subsequently put responsibility for organisational and staffing matters on to individual departments and created entrenched departmental autonomies.¹

Mike Ahern, after successfully challenging Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen for the leadership of the National Party in 1987 and subsequently becoming Premier, attempted to reform the public sector through the creation of cabinet committees supported by bureaucratic committees.² This concept, like the PSMC, evoked divided opinion in a number of Queensland Speaks interviews, with Peter Henneken on one hand stating that whilst it was foreign to the public service at the time the reforms may have been successful had there been more time to implement them, and Erik Finger on the other bluntly attesting that they weren’t a success because the Ministers at the time simply ‘wouldn’t wear it’.³ Despite widespread support for public sector reform, like the Ahern model the reviews conducted by the PSMC were unfamiliar to most public servants in Queensland. Dr Peter Coaldrake, Chair of the PSMC from its inception in 1990 until Brian Head (Office of Cabinet prior to this⁴) took over in 1994,⁵ perfectly explicates in an interview with The Courier-Mail the prevailing public sector attitude towards these changes, stating that ‘... within the public service ... there is support for the spirit of reform. It is one thing to be supportive of the spirit of reform – but it is another thing to accept the effects of reform...’⁶

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¹ Andrew Stewart, ‘Taking milk from fat cats,’ Queensland Times, 10 February 1990.
⁴ Please note that the departments listed after each person depicts their position during the Goss Government.
⁵ Brian Head acted as Chair for the PSMC from 1994 until the end of the commission in 1996. Taken from: ‘Brian Head’, Who’s Who in Australia, (Melbourne: Crown Content Pty Ltd, 2012), 1039.
This notion will be expanded upon to illustrate that whilst most public servants supported the need for reform, concerns over the practicalities of the reforms and the manner in which they were implemented overshadow the positive outcomes of the PSMC. The following table highlights the validity of this hypothesis by clearly outlining the attitudes of key public servants interviewed for the *Queensland Speaks* project.

**ATTITUDES OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED FOR THE QUEENSLAND SPEAKS PROJECT TOWARDS THE PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT COMMISSION (PSMC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position during PSMC</th>
<th>Positive Attitude?</th>
<th>Public Servant Prior to PSMC?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brian Head</td>
<td>Chair of PSMC: 1994-1996</td>
<td>Yes, but also critical of process</td>
<td>1990-1994: Executive Director of Premier’s Depart; Associate Professor in Public Policy Studies at Griffith University prior to this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Scott</td>
<td>Policy Officer for Women’s Policy Unit in the Office of Cabinet, came to work for the PSMC later in the project</td>
<td>Yes but critical of process and outcomes</td>
<td>Employed by the Bjelke-Petersen government as a junior officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Coaldrake</td>
<td>Chair of PSMC: 1990-1994</td>
<td>Yes, but outlined some of the shortcomings</td>
<td>No, Acting Pro-Vice Chancellor of QUT until 1989-1990, academic prior to this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Henneken</td>
<td>Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations</td>
<td>No, but believed the public service was ready for a change. Didn’t like the way it came about - too disruptive.</td>
<td>Employed public service in 1969 using his connections with the ‘Catholic Mafia’. Directly prior to PSMC he was employed by the Department of Labour Relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Scott</td>
<td>Director-General for the Department of Education</td>
<td>Not really - good and bad aspects to it</td>
<td>No, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Canberra directly before becoming Director-General and eminent academic prior to this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erik Finger</td>
<td>Director-General of the Department of the Premier, Economic and Trade Development</td>
<td>Not really - good and bad aspects to it</td>
<td>Employed by the Department of Main Roads in 1961, became Commissioner for Main Roads in 1982.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leigh Tabrett</td>
<td>Director-General of the State Office of Higher Education</td>
<td>Yes, but the reforms didn’t go deep enough</td>
<td>Long serving public servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Ellis</td>
<td>Director-General of Department of Industry Development</td>
<td>Yes, but critical of some aspects</td>
<td>Long serving public servant since 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Matchett</td>
<td>Director-General of Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs</td>
<td>Yes, but a time of great stress for many public servants</td>
<td>Employed as a social worker, played a key role in the Queensland Domestic Violence Taskforce that reported in 1988 and in developing the Women’s Policy Unit before becoming the first female Director-General in 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Sullivan</td>
<td>Employed as part of Senior Executive Service</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Principal of Kirwan High School in Townsville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Leo Keliher</td>
<td>Employed by PSMC as a Manager for Reviews in 1990; made Director of Reviews in Feb 1992</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Employed in 1970 by why is now known as Centre for Information Technology and Communications (CITEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*John</td>
<td>Employed in Department of</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Long-serving public servant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Support for change within the Queensland public service is cited by Henneken, Ann Scott, Peter Ellis and Finger in their interviews for the *Queensland Speaks* project. Henneken, Finger and Ellis were all senior public servants under the Bjelke-Petersen era and as such saw firsthand the need for reform, whilst Scott who was also employed by the Bjelke-Petersen government but as a junior officer, was employed by the PSMC to conduct reviews. Ellis in particular states in his *Queensland Speaks* interview that he was excited about the reviews because he saw the opportunity to ‘get everything fixed up’ in his department.7 During an interview in 2001 Leo Keliher, another public servant employed by the PSMC to help develop a standard methodology for conducting departmental reviews8, claimed the PSMC reviews were “the first serious examination and structural efficiency-effectiveness type review undertaken since J D Story’s days in the 1930s” and as such was ‘really ground-breaking stuff’9. Given his role in the PSMC this statement is not surprising, however John Ford (internal Department of Education review appointee, seconded to the Department of Lands review) agrees with this notion, purporting that this lack of precedence provided the most challenges for the reviews.10

In August 1989 the Labor Party released their reform policy, stating their intention was to ‘reunify the public service under Westminster principles with an end to widespread employment contracts, corporatisation, privatisation, unnecessary consultancies and redundancies’.11 This is in keeping with Premier Wayne Goss’s promise earlier in the year that ‘the broad band of public servants will not be directly effected [sic] by the administrative rearrangements currently being undertaken. The only public servants who may experience some change would be those at the chief executive level’.12 These attempts to reassure a nervous public service by the Labor government were rendered moot when a story was published in the *Sunday Sun* claiming that Coaldrake had informed a national conference in Hobart in November 1990 that 500 of the 900 Queensland public servants on contracts could be excluded from the Senior Executive Service (SES), leading to uncertainty regarding their future employment.13 The article also quoted the Queensland State Service

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8 Personal Communication with Brian Head, 30 January 2012.
9 Leo Keliher during interview with Brett Matthews and Roger Scott, 7 November 2001.
10 Personal Communication with John Ford, 1 February 2012.
Union’s general secretary Laurie Gillespie challenging Coaldrake to clarify what effect the institution of an SES would have on contract tenures and pointing out insensitivity displayed by Coaldrake in discussing this issue with an outside body, given the apprehension growing within the public service over possible changes to tenure.\(^\text{14}\)

With the support of the government and public service, the PSMC was to be headed by three commissioners in charge of a Classifications Review Tribunal. This Tribunal, along with a new Public Service Ombudsman, replaced the office of Public Service Personnel Management (PSPM) and were designed to complement both the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) and the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) which were created as a result of findings in the Fitzgerald Report.\(^\text{15}\) The Commissioners appointed to run the PSMC in 1990 were Coaldrake (Acting Pro Vice-Chancellor of Queensland University of Technology)\(^\text{16}\), Glyn Davis (who had just returned from America and had taken an academic job at Griffith University)\(^\text{17}\) and Philip Selth (long-serving federal public servant previously based in Canberra),\(^\text{18}\) supported by a small team. Each had a specific area that they were in charge of: Coaldrake was initially in charge of reviews, but after discussions with Davis took charge of Standards and CO appointments; Davis was in charge of Equity and assisted the Director of Reviews, Selth.\(^\text{19}\)

The need for a speedy reform process was impressed upon the Commissioners, with the Goss mantra of ‘governments are elected to reform, not re-elected to reform’ key in everyone’s minds. Peter Ellis in particular remembers this, stating that Goss put the PSMC under pressure to make changes quickly.\(^\text{20}\) In his interview for *Queensland Speaks*, Coaldrake recalls that whilst ‘there was nothing on [his] desk when [he] started’ and found it difficult to know where to begin, he was aware that they probably would only have three years to complete the reforms.\(^\text{21}\) Further pressure was placed on him when the Premier confirmed Coaldrake would only have his position in the PSMC for as long as he (the Premier) retained confidence in him.\(^\text{22}\) The speed in which these reviews were conducted was criticised by many who believed the PSMC moved too quickly.\(^\text{23}\) In defence of Goss, this seemed to be a rather pragmatic move given that the Fitzgerald Inquiry had just occurred and as Coaldrake states, the findings of institutional issues surrounding the public service derived from the inquiry meant that changes had to be made even though there was no formal call for it to take place.\(^\text{24}\)

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\(^{14}\) ibid.


\(^{16}\) ‘Peter Coaldrake’, *Who’s Who in Australia*, (Melbourne: Crown Content Pty Ltd, 2012), 495.


\(^{22}\) ibid, 00:30:42-00:30:58.

\(^{23}\) ibid, 00:30:29-00:30:58.

\(^{24}\) ibid, 00:26:49-00:27:13.
The issue of who should be conducting the reviews created some antagonism between the PSMC and other department heads who, being used to unchallenged autonomy over their departments, believed they were the most qualified to conduct the reviews of their departments.\textsuperscript{25} Feelings ran so strong within some departments that over Christmas 1989, department heads leaked stories to the media about ‘inexperienced academics’ trying to restructure the public service. The response from the government was a demand from Goss for progress reports from all department heads in an attempt to reassert control over the public service.\textsuperscript{26} Senior bureaucrats also accused the PSMC of being too academic,\textsuperscript{27} with \textit{The Courier Mail} claiming that many critics within the public and private sector had written Peter Coaldrake off as one of several academics within the PSMC, which ‘blunder[ed] through the reform process with an impractical academic approach’.\textsuperscript{28} Ford recollects that ‘anti-intellectualism had underpinned the character of Queensland politics for many years… The National Party and Labor before them reveled in the fact that their members were from the ‘school of hard knocks’ and universities were seen with outright suspicion’. He points out that the suspicion of many in the public service regarding Coaldrake in particular was unwarranted given his publication of \textit{Working the System} in 1989 which examined public sector governance, although he suspects that few in the public sector had actually read it.\textsuperscript{29}

In terms of conducting the reviews, Henneken in particular believes that whilst the ‘formula’ used by the PSMC to conduct their reviews worked with some departments, it was not suited to all,\textsuperscript{30} and an article published in \textit{The Courier-Mail} quoted an anonymous public servant from the Executive Building who claimed that the public service in Queensland was unique in that they were systematically working against the Goss Government.\textsuperscript{31} The article mentioned the Department of Education in particular, stating that a ‘number of sources’ portrayed it as an ‘area demoralised, turned upside down and inside out, with a subsequent exodus of talent which has been of acute concern to the reformists themselves’.\textsuperscript{32} Professor Roger Scott, Director-General for the Department of Education during this time, states this ‘exodus’ was not the sole responsibility of the PSMC, rather that it could also be blamed on tempting redundancy packages made available for those wishing to leave the public service.\textsuperscript{33} Professor Scott also stated that a process evolved of seconding staff from the department under review to join both their department’s review team and a second review team, in order to give public servants a better understanding of the review process which they could take back to their relevant departments – within the Department of Education, this role was given to John Ford.\textsuperscript{34} Coaldrake was well aware of the criticisms, joking that there is nothing worse than to be seen as academic when trying to

\textsuperscript{25} Andrew Stewart, ‘Taking milk from fat cats,’ \textit{Queensland Times}, 10 February 1990.
\textsuperscript{26} ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Hedley Thomas, ‘The PS Timebomb,’ \textit{The Courier Mail}, 12 October 1991.
\textsuperscript{29} Personal Communication with John Ford, 1 February 2012.
\textsuperscript{31} Hedley Thomas, ‘The PS Timebomb,’ \textit{The Courier Mail}, 12 October 1991.
\textsuperscript{32} ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Personal Communication with Roger Scott, 20 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{34} ibid.
undertake a review, and in hindsight believes that a decision to not release full reports from the first stage of reviews was a mistake because the release of reports in the second helped to deal with criticism of PSMC. Critics were able to see that the work was highly professional, the staff had ownership of their work, and this led to more collaboration with departments. This is in contrast to what Professor Scott has to say, recalling that in the Department of Education some areas were helped by the report, but some cut across changes that were already occurring in the department and were not very expert despite consultation between the PSMC and the department.

Some departments embraced the reviews and Coadrake mentions in his Queensland Speaks interview that a few, such as the Department of Lands headed by Bruce Wilson, were very cooperative. Henneken also remembers that his Director-General in the Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations, Barry Nutter, decided to go through the review process, but refused to ‘spill all the jobs and start again’. Finger believes that what the review of Premier’s Department was trying to implement was already taking place, and this created a degree of confirmation rather than ‘turning the whole place upside down’.

For the majority of public servants, however, the uncertainty of retaining positions in the public service meant the reviews were a frightening time, and Ruth Matchett recalls there was a big culture shock because for many people they hadn’t ever had to prepare a job application, look at their skills and match them against selection criteria, and go through an interview process to obtain a position previously. Ann Scott also states in her Queensland Speaks interview that it was a very difficult period for senior public service with people moving out or being replaced. The PSMC was accused of turning departments upside down through their reviews and new organisational methods, the ‘sacking’ of public servants and voluntary redundancies, and the replacement of these experienced public servants with less experienced ones from interstate (‘Mexicans’). Whilst Coadrake conceded in an interview with the Weekend Australian that ‘restructuring had been handled less sensitively in some departments’, he states in his Queensland Speaks interview that 80% of CO’s and SES positions were given to Queenslanders, and he was very careful to let The Courier Mail know this. When the story appeared in the paper, he remembers the headline read ‘Mexican’s Repelled at the Border’ and ‘knew

43 Barbara Henson, ‘Queensland forced to bite bullet on reform,’ Weekend Australian, 7-8 December 1991.
Head believes the blame directed towards the PSMC for the dismissal of senior public servants is disproportionate to their responsibility. He explained at a Centre for the Government of Queensland symposium in January 2012 that the Premier’s decision at the start of his term to place a number of senior public servants into political ‘limbo’ with no substantive duties (also known as the ‘Gulag’) is often confused with the post-review restructuring of departments which saw staff ‘redeployed’ and senior positions either removed or readvertised. He believes that the resentment created by these two different events was used by critics as ‘evidence of radical restructuring and politicisation of the public service’.

Henneken believes the ‘insensitivity’ mentioned by Coaldrake was due to his belief that the public service ‘had to be thrown in the air and start again’, and that Goss had a dim view of the role of public servants and ‘how hard they didn’t work’. He states that it was unfair to move people on as it was very disruptive to both individuals and the running of the department, and this is something Matchett in particular recalls, stating that the reviews created a big disruption in organisational processes within departments. Brian Head confirms in his *Queensland Speaks* interview that the Premier was notoriously unsympathetic towards public servants, teachers, police and other public sector workers, but explained at a later date that Goss didn’t trust any public servants except those working for the PSMC because they were working with the government towards reforming the public service, rather than being an unknown quantity like the others.

Head also believes the PSMC developed a different mode of operation, which led to a more rational, effective and efficient public service, however many believe the reforms did not ‘go deep enough’. Leigh Tabrett in particular mentions that whilst new people were brought in at the top level, there were still the same senior male staff who had been in the department for ‘25 years’ and had no intentions of changing anything. She states these people knew more about the work and the government than the new directors, they still had all their networks established and refused to change their attitudes – it was then up to the directors to manage this and try to ‘crack this cultural thing’. She recalls that the strength of the male networks and their handshake deals made it difficult to implement the reforms. At a symposium for the Queensland Speaks project in January 2012, Robin Sullivan stated that she experienced an additional problem, citing her

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45 Personal Communication with Brian Head, 20 January 2012.
46 *ibid.*
48 *ibid.*
51 Personal Correspondence with Brian Head, 20 January 2012.
54 *ibid.*
experience as being one of the new SES appointments whose careers had evolved outside of Brisbane, as opposed to the majority of senior public servants who had gained promotion through ‘head office progression’, ie. a geographic issue.\textsuperscript{55} Taking part in the same symposium, Head stated that the problems mentioned by Tabrett in her \textit{Queensland Speaks} interview were contextual, based on gender ratio in the public service and different departmental agendas.\textsuperscript{56} Ford however confirms that he was aware of efforts to denigrate one particular female SES appointee ‘with sexist remarks, efforts to undermine initiatives and engaging in what [he] would term ‘malicious obedience’ – following directions but withholding vital information that would improve the outcomes sought’.\textsuperscript{57}

Comments taken from Erik Finger’s \textit{Queensland Speaks} interview support Tabrett’s view that the reforms didn’t go deep enough, mentioning that he believes the PSMC didn’t solve all the problems facing the public service. Finger also states in the interview that the organisation focused too much attention on chairing committees rather than addressing problems associated with the level of accountability and responsibility given to departments.\textsuperscript{58} In his 2001 interview, Keliher also states that the PSMC did not plan their ‘end game’ properly, and a lot of its criticism was targeted at their lack of plan once the reviews were done.\textsuperscript{59} This is an interesting recollection from Keliher because, as mentioned previously, he was employed by the PSMC to develop a standard methodology for conducting reviews and became head of the Review section when Selth left the PSMC in 1991.\textsuperscript{60}

Despite all the negatives mentioned, one positive achievement stands out when people talk of the PSMC – the introduction of merit based appointments, which incorporated equal opportunities for women. In an interview with \textit{The Sun}, Davis stated that the PSMC was very conscious that equity was not exclusively about women’s rights or reaching employment quotas regardless of merit because this attacked symptoms rather than attitudes. He believes equity principles must be ‘supported by sound human resource management standards, which provide a lead for new behaviours, and a guide to good practice.’\textsuperscript{61} Whilst the views expressed by Davis were highly controversial, Matchett believes this approach allowed for fairer selection processes and enabled the recruitment of people from outside the public sector, which was a major step forward because previously positions were only advertised in the government gazette or not at all.\textsuperscript{62} Sullivan recalls that at the time of the reviews, she viewed the PSMC’s activity as positive due to their encouragement of a wider and more diverse range of applicants to seek promotion, however looking back she remembers that many involved in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item Personal Communication with Robin Sullivan, 20 January 2012.
  \item Personal Communication with Brian Head, 20 January 2012.
  \item Personal Communication with John Ford, 1 February 2012.
  \item Leo Keliher during interview with Brett Matthews and Roger Scott, 7 November 2001.
  \item David Smith, ‘Equity commissioner takes on discrimination: Out go the bad old days,’ \textit{The Sun}, 24 September 1990.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
selection processes were mindful of following procedures assiduously which often resulted in bureaucratic red-tape.\textsuperscript{63}

From listening to \textit{Queensland Speaks} interviews conducted with senior public servants from this era, it is evident that initial support for public sector reform was extensive, with Labor promoting the PSMC as the white knight of bureaucratic reform, vanquishing the iniquitous and indolent attitudes instilled in the public service during the conservative Bjelke-Petersen era. Change is the nature of the political beast, and as Glyn Davis points out ‘any new government wants to review its own machinery’.\textsuperscript{64} Whilst there will always be supporters and detractors to change, the controversial method in which the reviews and subsequent reforms were carried out, and the general opinion that they did not go deep enough, overshadow the positive achievements brought about by the PSMC. As stated at the start of this paper, Goss’s bureaucratic Reformation provided Queensland’s public service the opportunity to break away from the staid yoke of political conservatism. Initiatives derived from the reforms such as merit-based selection provided new vibrancy to the public sector, but for the most part the PSMC’s success was hampered by anti-intellectual distrust and resistance within the public sector once the true nature of change became clear.

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\textbf{Further Reading}


\textit{Queensland Times}


\textit{Sunday Sun}

\textit{The Australian}

\textit{The Courier Mail}

\textit{The Sun}

\textit{Weekend Australian}


\textsuperscript{63} Personal Communication with Robin Sullivan, 20 January 2012.

\textsuperscript{64} Dr Glyn Davis, ‘Goodbye to the days of pounds and shillings,’ \textit{The Courier Mail}, 19 December 1991.